Peyama Azadi Manset
The role of the military sphere in building the security order in Israel
As Israel approaches its jubilee, militarism becomes topical once again, as does the need to examine its crucial role in the building of Israel. The modern Israeli state is still bequeathed with the Zionist sense of moral rightness in the use of power, adopting the militaristic views of most academics, according to which Israel’s perceived need for institutional violence as well for being permanently prepared for both full-scale war and occasional use of limited violence is highly estimated. As Charles Tilly aptly put it: “Nations make war and war makes nations.” Militarism in the “Israeli case-study” takes a belligerent policy beyond the goal of national defense. The potential adversaries are defined as “militants” and attacks against them are seen as part of a wider defense/deterrence policy.
Israel has introduced institutional arrangements which reproduce its militaristic policy. Israeli schools are still one of the major hubs where the militaristic survivalist is bred; their mission is to form the “New Jew”, the young Israeli citizen trained for the conquest of labour, for settling the land, and guarding (shmira) the state. The judicial system, too, continues to operate on the basis of permanent demands for security deriving from the conflict with the Palestinians, giving high priority to defense requirements and tasks. A quite interesting phenomenon is the fact that military courts in the Occupied Territories – which differ from military courts in Israel itself since the late 1970s – try non- Israeli citizens (West Bank and Gaza residents) only, operating also under different laws for Jewish settlements and Palestinian municipalities.
Nevertheless, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) -(which include the Israeli Army, the Air Force and the Sea
Corps) still play a central role in preserving the militaristic status of the state, enjoying wide political consensus for its practices of control. The IDF is called upon to deter or repel a full-scale Arab invasion such as the ones experienced both in the first and second Arab-Israeli Wars (1948, 1956), and the one feared during the Six- Day war (1967). Defending the Jewish state’s very existence, “justified” a high level of social and economic mobilization, enabling the government to maintain a high level of military expenditure along with improving the overall economic situation. During 1950-66, Israel spent an average of 9% of GDP on defense, while in the 1956-1966 period, military forces were gradually upgraded from an upstart army to a professional fighting force with nuclear capabilities.
At the same time, the IDF gradually built its civilian image as the great equalizer of the Israeli society. The army cut across ethnic (edah), religious and socio-economic boundaries, uniting Israelis under the ideal of fighting for the “common good”. Military service functioned as a rite of passage, urging the majority to be involved in active combat for defending Jewish land.
Since the 1967 war, mass militarism developed, projecting the image of a society always under Arab siege. This translated into the occupation of the territories, national and religious extremism, and a massive increase in military budgets. This growth of national defense expenditure was in part related to the evolution of the Israeli defense industry and not to reasons of political defense (offensive, not defensive wars). According to economic analysts, a dichotomy developed between the performance of the big economy and that of the small economy, whose activities and investments were decentralized. Since 1957, the big economy has been performing in a manner contrary to the rest of the business sector (the small economy), and it has undergone the same process as its U.S. equivalent, moving to intensive activity in defense development and trade. Besides, the growing role of the U.S. defense industry in the Middle East since 1967 was another decisive element in the build-up of Israel’s militarism. According to Israeli Professor Shimshon Bichler, within the framework of his theory of differential accumulation, the increase in the export of military materiel to Israel together with the increase in U.S. military aid, led to an increasing dependence of con-secutive Israeli governments on the U.S. administration, which indirectly subsidized and supported the entrance and involvement of international capital groups into the Middle East.
In addition to economic changes since 1967, the political institutions in Israel also underwent a deep change; the decline of Government power and the sub- sequent state intervention in the economic sphere resulted in direct political roles for the army leadership, mainly through the establishment of a military government in the occupied territories. These developments changed the early pattern of a non-political citizen army, subordinate to the civil authorities, to a new pattern of political-military partnership. This collaboration was even reinforced after the 1973 war and the consequent land loss. The latter served as the primary catalyst for the crystallization of conflict-oriented political priorities. The IDF acquired advanced weaponry and developed sophisticated tactics and restraints quite different from those used in conventional warfare. In particular, the army was extensively used to counter specific terrorist operations within Israel, for example hostage-taking incidents, developing at the same time an Israeli military industrial complex which has influenced the entire economy. The national security effort in Israel in the early 1980s constituted between a quarter and a third of Israel’s GNP, about half of the government’s budget, and involved a fourth of the labour force.
The economic infrastructure of the “security sector” reduced in the 1990’s (though still maintaining one the highest levels of military expenditure in the world). After the Oslo Agreements of 1994, the IDF cut its expenditure, giving place to a deceptive civil militarism. In 1996, the military budget accounted for only 10.6% of the GDP and represented about 21.5% of the total 1996 budget.
The IDF’s military superiority was seen as a tool for moderating Arab political expectations in the conflict. Military force was in fact a means of carrying out diplomacy, which was not highly estimated by a public opinion focused on assimilating the realities of the new cultural war (kulturkamf). According to successive polls during the 1987-1999 period, an average of 35.5 percent of the Jewish Israeli population considered their country’s military strength to be decreasing, while at the same time condemning the military system of mass recruitment.
Peace movements undertook to challenge mass militarism by advancing not a praetorian militaristic system, but a civil one. However, even in the level of rhetoric, the achievement of peace was never presented in unconditional terms and was often equated with Israel’s security. Most of the peace movements were accused of unintended collaboration with the military occupation and Jewish settlements in the territories, being in fact part of social elites strongly embedded in the consolidated militaristic ethos. For instance, most of the “Peace now” activists agreed that it was better to leave Arab citizens out of the political battle over the future of the state, reasoning that conflict-related issues were in fact “internal Jewish matters”. In their view, the achievement of piece in the region would only be attainable if and when the “Arabs” understand that the Jewish state is indestructible.
The “security syndrome” embedded in the entire Israeli society (even in the most peace-friendly segment) has actually urged for more warfare after the collapse of the “peace agreements”, legitimizing additional IDF operations after the second Intifada (2000) and the summer war with Hezbollah (2006). In fact, the latter marked are vival of mass militarism in Israel, which is also discernible in Israel’s current foreign policy.
In particular, Israel’s military leadership, still arguing over acting in self-defense against the Arabs, exacerbates the already technical state of war (not active) that exists between Israel and its two northern neighbors.
The IDF claims that Syria still supplies weaponry to Hezbollah, including medium-range rockets, to replace those destroyed by the Israel Air Force during the Lebanon War, however not intending to spark a direct bilateral conflict. At the same time, the IDF diminishes the possibility of a forehead war with Hezbollah, regarding that the latter is not currently interested in another conflict against Israel due to the physical and material damage it suffered in 2006. Budgetary considerations, however, seem to be a definitive factor in Israel’s policy. Israel’s month-long war against Hizbullah has led to a significant economic losses (a total gap of NIS 8 million-USD 1.8 million) for the Israeli government, which avoids using the military to perform major policing tasks that may diminish its strength.
Current working plans include security challenges facing the IDF together with the lessons learnt from the past and discreet budgetary estimations. Those estimations take into account the concern about global jihad, the risks posed by the Hamas government in the Palestinian Authority and Iran’s nuclear race. As far as the “Palestinian issue” is concerned, Israeli military experts seem to reject the possibility of Mahmoud Abbas taking back control of the Gaza Strip by himself. For the IDF, Hamas continues to be the real danger. Therefore, the military leadership is strongly opposed to the new Yemeni-sponsored reconciliation accord which was signed by the two Palestinians parties, fearing that it could lead to Hamas’ future reinforcement.
The major threat, however, facing the IDF is Iran’s nuclear program and the sense of security that nuclear capabilities will give to Tehran. Israeli concerns about the prospect of Iran attaining independent nuclear manufacturing capability (and using it against Israel) have intensified. Apart from the US help in pressing Iran in the diplomatic sphere, a second step could possibly involve the launching of preventive strikes against Iran’s nuclear installations. According, to Defense News, the Israelis are in the midst of a rigorous effort to test and improve their defensive systems using simulations of Iranian missile attacks. There is the issue of Israel’s expanding missile defence program, which is currently composed of the Israeli Arrow system and the most recent versions of the Patriot system. In this regard, missile defence may be one of the most important guarantees of Israel’s future survival and security, forcing once again Israeli mass militarism.
Given the current political data, Israeli militarism is still massive in proportion, while the perception of a besieged Jewish society persists; “Security” is a rallying call legalizing any type of warfare in order to suppress “external threats”. Security issues still loom large in the negotiations with “national enemies”, making periodic wars in the future inevitable.