Η αρμενική κυβέρνηση «επιζητεί» την επικύρωση των πρωτοκόλλων, αφήνοντας, ουσιαστικά, στην άκρη τα αδιαπραγμάτευτα, έως σήμερα, διπλωματικά της χαρτιά. Το Ερεβάν, αλλάζοντας πολιτική στάση, φαίνεται να αφήνει στην άκρη το καυτό θέμα της αναγνώρισης της αρμενικής γενοκτονίας από τους Τούρκους, παραπέμποντας το θέμα σε αρμόδια τουρκοαρμενική επιτροπή ιστορικών (τουρκική πρόταση την οποία και καταδίκαζε η εκάστοτε αρμενική κυβέρνηση στο παρελθόν). Για την κυβέρνηση Sarkisyan, και παρά τις έντονες αντιδράσεις της αντιπολίτευσης, του ARF,  και  της πλειοψηφίας των κοινοτήτων της αρμένικης διασποράς, «η ομαλοποίηση των σχέσεων με την Άγκυρα θα καταστήσει ευκολότερη και την αναγνώριση της γενοκτονίας, μη θέτοντας σε κίνδυνο τα εθνικά συμφέροντα». Η αλλαγή της αρμενικής κυβερνητικής πολιτικής στρατηγικής πάνω στο ζήτημα (συμβάλλοντας εν μέρει στην αποπολιτικοποίηση της Γενοκτονίας), συνδεόμενη και με την απουσία οιαδήποτε σύνδεσης de jure στο θέμα του Nagorno-Karabakh φαίνεται, ωστόσο, να διευκολύνει και τις τουρκικές πολιτικές κινήσεις επιρροής στην ευρύτερη περιοχή, αποσυνδέοντας τα «πρωτόκολλα» από τα στενά οικονομικά οφέλη που θα αποκομίσουν οι δύο χώρες.

Αν και μέχρι στιγμής παραμένει ακόμη αβέβαιη η επικύρωση των εγγράφων και από τις δύο πλευρές, η επίσημη σύναψη διπλωματικών σχέσεων της Αρμενίας με την Άγκυρα και το ακόλουθο άνοιγμα των διασυνοριακών πυλών, δε θα σημάνει μόνο άρση του οικονομικού αποκλεισμού της χώρας, αλλά και επαναπροσδιορισμό των συνταγματικών της αναφορών και βλέψεων για ανάκτηση των ιστορικών αρμενικών εδαφών (ακόλουθο και του πνεύματος της τρίτης και έβδομης παραγράφου των πρωτοκόλλων περί αποφυγής «ανάθεμα» πολιτικών χειρισμών στο όνομα των ειρηνικών διπλωματικών σχέσεων και της μη δυνατότητας παραβίασης των συνόρων). Η Αρμενία, φαίνεται να θέτει, στην ουσία, τους διπλωματικούς κανόνες της Άγκυρας, διευκολύνοντας την αναθεωρητική πολιτική «περιφερειακής δύναμης» που η τελευταία ακολουθεί.

Με την επικύρωση των πρωτοκόλλων η κυβέρνηση Erdoğan (παρά τις όποιες αντιδράσεις της τουρκικής αντιπολίτευσης) παίρνει επισήμως το χαρτί «καλής διαγωγής» από Ένωση και ΗΠΑ, ενισχύοντας ακόμη περισσότερο το ρόλο της Τουρκίας ως σημαντικό παίκτη περιφερειακής επιρροής στην περιοχή. Η ‘Άγκυρα, δηλαδή, μέσα από τη φαινομενική  «ουδετεροποίηση» του Ερεβάν στο ζήτημα  του Nagorno-Karabakh, παγιώνει και τη θέση της ως κύρια σταθεροποιητική δύναμη στις εστίες εντάσεων του υποσυστήματος, προσβλέποντας σε ακόμη μεγαλύτερη επιρροή στις τουρκογενείς δημοκρατίες, όπως σε αυτή του Αζερμπαϊτζάν.

Η εξομάλυνση, εξάλλου,  των ήδη «ταραγμένων» σχέσεων, – μετά την υπογραφή των πρωτοκόλλων – , με το Μπακού παραμένει προτεραιότητα του ΑΚΡ, προσβλέποντας σε ανάκτηση της «γνωστής» στρατηγικής εταιρικής σχέσης με τους Αζέρους, ειδικά μετά  τα «ενεργειακά ανοίγματα» των τελευταίων προς τη Μόσχα και την ενδεχόμενη ανατροπή των ενεργειακών σχεδίων της Ένωσης, η οποία και στοχεύει στη μείωση της ενεργειακής εξάρτησής της από τη Ρωσία.

Η διασφάλιση των παραδοσιακών φιλικών σχέσεων με το Αζερμπαϊτζάν, παραμένει κύρια κατευθυντήρια της τουρκοαρμενικής προσέγγισης,  και της προώθησης  των τουρκικών περιφερειακών σχεδίων, γεγονός που η Τουρκία το γνωρίζει καλά.

Ενδεχόμενη παράταση του τωρινού «ψυχροπολεμικού» κλίματος Μπακού – Άγκυρας, δε στέκεται μόνο εμπόδιο στην προώθηση της τουρκικής πολιτικής “των μηδενικών προβλημάτων με τους γείτονες” (μέρος της οποίας, αποτελούν και η επικύρωση των «πρωτοκόλλων»), αλλά ανατρέπει και τους έως σήμερα «σίγουρους» παραδοσιακούς στρατηγικούς συσχετισμούς στην ευρύτερη περιοχή.

Η ίδια η υπογραφή, εξάλλου των πρωτοκόλλων, υπήρξε απόρροια τέτοιων ανατροπών, καθιστώντας την ίδια την επικύρωσή τους πολυπαραγοντική και αρκετά αβέβαιη….

Ιανουάριος 2010

Bi vî re, di wî rojê de, (10.10.2009) danezana Serokkomarê Ermenîstanê Serj Şarkişyan, ji bo destpê- kirina pêwendiyên dîplomasiyên fermî (pesentkirina protokolan) di binesîstema Qafqasiya de “bêşert” cardin şekil dide lêkanîna deveran û daneyên jeopolîtîk yên hemî herêmê jî.

Hikimeta ermenî daxwaza pesentkirina protokolan dike lê di rastiyê de heya îro, kartên xwe yên dîplomatîkiyên nayên guftûgokirin jî datîne kenarekê. Yêrîvan, bi guhartina pozîsiyona polîtîk wisa xuya dike ku mijara sotîner a komkujiya ermeniyan ku ji aliyê tirkan ve hatibû kirin û vî mijarê hewaleyê komîsiyona rayedarên dîroknasên tirk û ermenan dike( angaşta tirkan ya ku di dûhatû de her tim ji aliyê hikumeta ermenî ve dihate mehkûm kirin). Hikumeta Şarkişyan, ji bilî vebizavên (reaksiyonên) tund ên partiya muxalîf (ARF) û yên ciwata ermeniyan ya derveyê welat “ bi başkirina pêwendiyan bi Enqerê re ew ê bi hêsantî naskirina komkujiya ermeniyan bi dest bixe û bêyî ku berjewendiyên netewayî bixe li nav tehlûkê””. Guhêrîna stratejiya polîtîk a hikumeta ermenî li ser vî mêjarê ( ji aliyekê ve dibe bêpolîtîkakirina komkujiyê), û bi vî re jî girêdayî kêmasiya her tiştekê tê zanîn a pêwendiya de jure di mesela Nagorno-Karabaxê de xuya dike ku ,cudakirina pêwendiya protokolan ji berjewediya aboriya teng ku herdu welat dê jê fêde bigrin, bandora tevgerên polîtîkayên tirkan li hemî herême bi gîştî bi hêsantir bike. Ermenîstan  bi rakirina qanûnên Enqerê yên dîplomatîkî li ser esasê, polîtîka wê ya reformîst “ mîna hêza herêmê” k u di vî dawiyê de dişopîne hêsan dike.

Her çend heya niha pesentkirina belgeyan ji herdu aliyan ve nehatbe xuyakirin jî, çêkirina pêwendiyên dîplomatîkî yên Ermenîstanê bi Tirkiyayê re û bi vî re jî vekirina deriyên sînorên di navbera wan de, ew ê tenê neyê mana rakirina ambargoya aborî li ser welat lê belê dê bê mana cardî çikirina raport û nêrînên qanûnên wê yên bingehîn jî (mana paragrafa sêyemîn û ya heftemîn a protokolan ji der heqê jêrevina “ lanet” polîtîkayên bikêrtên ji bo navê pêwendiyên dîplomatîkiyên aşîtîxwaz û îmkan nedayîna binpêkirina sînoran dîşopîne). Hikumeta ermenî, wisa xuya dike ku bi rakirina qanûnên dîplomatkiyên Enqerê li ber çavan, dê polîtîka reformîst a Enqerê “mîna hêza deverê” ku di van rojên dawiyê de dişopîne hêsan bîke.

Bi pesentkirina protokolan hikumeta T.Erdogan ( ji bilî hemberderketina tirkên muxalîf ) bi fermî karta “ lebata baş” ji Y.Ewropa û ji Y.D.Amerika digre û rola ku Turkiya mina lîstîkvana girîn a hêza deverê li herêmê dilîze hîn bi hêztir dike. Enqere, xwedênegiravî bi nutirbûna Yêrîvanê di mesela Nagono-Karabaxê de cîhê xwe di navendên vezelanan de mîna hêzeka sabîtker qahîm dike û bi vî rengî bi bandorekê hîn mezintir hukum li dewlwtên nîjattirkî , mîna ku Azerbeycanê dike.

Ji mili din ve jî serûberkirina  pêwendiyên êdî  nebaşin, – piştê ku îmzekirina protokolan-, AKP e zeftir Azeriyan tercîh dike, çavên xwe berdaye destxistina pêwendiya şirîgdariyek stratejîk bi Azerîyan re û bi taybetî jî piştê ku “ vebûna enerjiyê” ber bi Moskovayê ve di vî dawiyê de. Ev yek jî îhtimala kêmkirina  rajêriya enerjiyê( gaza xwezayî) ya Y.Ewropayê bi Rûsya re armanc dike.

Temînata pêwendiyên hevaltiyên kevneşopî bi Azerbeycanê re di nêzîkbûna tirkan û ermeniyan de û di pêşvexistina planên tirkan yên deverê de, di rastiyê de Enqere vî yekê baş dizane, mina berhêlkirdarekê di cîhê xwe de disekine. Îhtimala dereca teza “ şerê sar” ya îroyî ya Enqerq û Bakûyê ne tenê asteng e ji bo pêşvexistina palîtîkaya tirkan “ ya bi cîranan re ti pirsgirikek nemîne” (beşek vî  jî ji pesentkirina protokolan pêk tê) lê pêwendiyên “ emînên” stratejikên kevneşopîyên heya îro jî li hemî herêmê ser û binî dike. Ji milê din ve jî îmzekirina protokolan bi xwe re encamên wêranker tîne û pesentkirina wan jî pir bi faktor û nexuyayî dimîne…

beatrice_plcb@yahoo.com

Werger ji Yewnanî: Mervan Artos

mervan_artos@yahoo.com

Hükümetin hiç bir zaman Kemalizmle köprüleri atmak gibi bir amacı olmadı. (İslami yada İslam yanlısı bir düzen oluşturmak, böylece de tartışmasız tek güç olan ordu ve Kemalizm’e darbe vurmayı asla amaçlamadı). Tersine İslam yanlısı AKP politik olarak varlığını korumak için içgüdüsel olarak Hobscu par excellence politikasını, ki 2002 den beri Kürt Sorununa yaklaşım bu politikanın temel eksenini oluşturmaktadır, dayatmış durumdadır. İslam yanlısı Hükümetin net olmasa da yaklaşımının güç kazanması parlamentoda ılımlı bir Kürt muhalefetine ihtiyaç duymaktadır. AKP’nin siyasal olarak güçlenmek, en azından gücünü korumak için önerdiği yasal-anayasal değişiklikler (örneğin bir iktidar partinin kapatılmasını zorlaştırmak gibi) parlamentodaki Kürt yanlısı DTP azınlığının da onayına bağlı durumda. (AKP halkoyuna başvurmadan istediği yasal değişiklikleri parlamentodan geçirebilmek için 30 oya daha ihtiyaç duymaktadır çünkü 337 sandalye ile yasal değişiklikleri tek başına geçirme olanağı yok). Diğer yandan Erdoğan’ın son açıklamaları (Haziran 2009) AKP hükümetinin Eylülde başlayacak olan yeni Yasama döneminde oylamaya sunulacak reform paketleri ile ve elindeki Kürt kartı ile esas olarak Hükümetin parlamentoda elini güçlendirmeyi amaçlamaktadır.

Parlamentodaki “bilinen” Kürt muhalefeti de sürekli bir soyut sosyalizm söylemi ile ılımlı bir politik söylemi yeniden ve yeniden üreterek Hükümetle aynı eksende seyretmektedir. Bundan dolayı, özellikle Mart secimlerinden sonra elde ettiği görece kritik pozisyonu ile politik sistemi kilitleme konusunda aciz kalmaktadır.

DTP nin “yeni” önerilerini ve anayasal değişiklikler ile ilgili tutumunu açıkladığı – kısaca Demokratik Özerklik Projesi olarak da adlandırılan ve Erdoğan ın tezlerine karşılık kendi tezlerini one sürdükleri- Haziran ayındaki Parti bildirgesinde “Kürt Sorunu”nun HEP ten bu yana legalleşme adına teorileştirdiği bildik tezlerine tanık olmaktayız.

Yeni “proje” yürürlükteki Anayasanın ilk üç maddesinin değiştirilmesini ayrıca da 1921 Anayasası ile bir bütün olarak değiştirilmesini önermekte ve aşağıdaki temel taleplerde bulunmaktadır: devletin “resmi” dilinin Türkçe kalması ancak Kürtçenin eğitimde kullanılmasına olanak açılması, İtalyan, İspanyol ve Fransız modellerine uygun olarak kamu yönetiminin ademi merkeziyetçi temelde yeniden yapılandırılması.

1921 Anayasası ideolojik olarak “tek devlet”, “tek ulus” yerine “tek devlet”, “tek bayrak” düşüncesine dayanmaktadır. DTP nin siyasal anlayışına göre Osmanlı reformlarının geri getirilmesi “Kürt Sorunu”nun çözümü önündeki kanalları açacaktır. Kürt Sorunu bir kez daha ülkenin demokratikleştirilmesi sorununun bir parçası olarak ele alınmakta, çözümü de her defasında hükümetlerin reform politikalarında beklenmektedir. Kürt Sorunu 60’li yıllardan bu yana Türkiye’deki sol ve sendikal hareketin çengeline takılmış durumdadır ve bir kısır döngü yaşamaktadır.

Görünen o ki “tanzimat sendromu”na hem iktidardaki AKP hükümeti hem de parlamentodaki Kürt temsili umutlarını yatırmış durumdadır.

Osmanlı reformlarına dönüş ilkesi, birbiriyle mücadele halindeki iki siyasal rakibe aynı zamanda hizmet edebilir mi? Yoksa kaçınılmaz olarak siyasal bir kısır döngünün yeniden ve yeniden üretimine mi sürükler?

10 Ağustos 2009

Yunancadan çeviren: Dara Cibran

Κυβερνητικός στόχος, εξάλλου δεν υπήρξε ποτέ η (κατά πολλούς) ρήξη του κανόνα –κεμαλισμού (θεμελίωση μια νέας ισλαμικής/φιλο –ισλαμικής τάξης πραγμάτων και η ακόλουθη υπονόμευση της πάγιας κανονιστικής δύναμης, του στρατού). Αντιθέτως, η ίδια η (ενστικτώδης) πολιτική επιβίωση της φιλο –ισλαμικής του ΑΚΡ επιτάσσει μια χομπσιανή πολιτική par excellence, κύριος άξονας της οποίας (ήδη από το 2002) είναι η «κουρδική» προσέγγιση. Η ισχυροποίηση της επισφαλούς (μετά τις συνεχείς στρατιωτικές καταγγελίες για παύση) θέσης της φιλο – ισλαμικής κυβέρνησης έχει ανάγκη μια μετριοπαθή κουρδική κοινοβουλευτική αντιπολίτευση. Οι προωθούμενες συνταγματικές – νομοθετικές αλλαγές  του ΑΚΡ  με στόχο την πολιτική του ενδυνάμωση – παγίωση (κάνοντας δυσκολότερη την παύση ενός κόμματος εξουσίας) είναι άμεσα εξαρτημένες από την κοινοβουλευτική μειοψηφική  συναίνεση του κουρδικού DTP (είναι γνωστό ότι και «αριθμητικά» η κουρδική «επιδοκιμασία» είναι αναγκαία : το ΑΚΡ έχοντας 337 βουλευτές χρειάζεται τουλάχιστον 30 επιπλέον, για να επιτύχει νομοθετικές αλλαγές δίχως δημοψήφισμα). Οι τελευταίες,  συνεπώς, εξαγγελίες του Erdogan (Ιούνιος ’09) για ψήφιση νέων μεταρρυθμιστικών πακέτων από τη νέα νομοθετική περίοδο  διακυβέρνησης του ΑΚΡ (από τον ερχόμενο Σεπτέμβριο), ευνοϊκών προς τους «μειοψηφούντες», παγιώνουν έτσι τη γνώριμη «φιλο – κουρδική» πολιτική με κύριο στόχο την ίδια την κοινοβουλευτική εδραίωση της κυβέρνησης.

Στον ίδιο πολιτικό άξονα, όμως, (συνεχής αναπαραγωγή ενός αόριστου σοσιαλίζοντα μετριοπαθούς πολιτικού λόγου), είναι το ίδιο «γνώριμη» και η κουρδική κοινοβουλευτική εκπροσώπηση, αδυνατώντας όπως φαίνεται να προκαλέσει (εφόσον το θέλει), βρισκόμενη εκ νέου μετά τα εκλογικά αποτελέσματα του Μαρτίου στην οριακή θέση διαιτητού, την κατάλληλη «εμπλοκή» στο όλο πολιτικό σύστημα.

Στην παρουσίαση των «νέων» προτάσεων – συνταγματικών προσεγγίσεων του DTP (κατά τη διάρκεια των επίσημων διαβουλεύσεων του κόμματος – Ιούνιος ‘ 09), του λεγόμενου «Δημοκρατικού Αυτόνομου Σχεδίου» – απάντηση στις εξαγγελίες Erdogan, διαβάζουμε, ουσιαστικά, τη γνωστή πολιτική θεώρηση του «κουρδικού», αρχής γενομένης και πολιτικά νομιμοποιημένης από το ΗΕΡ (επίσημο πολιτικό πρόγραμμα του 1990).

Το νέο «Σχέδιο» προτείνει αλλαγή των 3 πρώτων άρθρων του Συντάγματος με παράλληλα υιοθέτηση αυτού του 1921, με βασικά αιτήματα τα «γνωστά» εξής : «επίσημη» γλώσσα του κράτους την τουρκική, χρήση της κουρδικής στην εκπαίδευση, και προώθηση μιας διοικητικής αποκέντρωσης, εξετάζοντας πολιτικά μοντέλα, όπως αυτό της Ιταλίας, Ισπανίας και Γαλλίας.

Η υιοθέτηση του Συντάγματος του 1921 θα αντανακλά το γνωστό ιδεολόγημα» : ένα κράτος – μία σημαία, απορρίπτοντας το «ισοπεδοτικό» ένα έθνος – μία σημαία. Κατά την πολιτική νοοτροπία του DTP η επαναφορά του οθωμανικών μεταρρυθμίσεων, θα προάγει και την ακόλουθη διευθέτηση του «κουρδικού». Το κουρδικό ζήτημα τίθεται, έτσι, ξανά στα πλαίσια της γνωστής αριστερίζουσας ιδεολογικής φόρμουλας (αγκιστρωμένη στην τουρκική αριστερή θεώρηση και οπτική περί διευθέτησης του κουρδικού ζητήματος, επισημοποιημένης συνδικαλιστικά από την δεκαετία του ‘ 60),  προσδιοριζόμενο ως αποτέλεσμα του γενικότερου ελλείμματος του εκδημοκρατισμού της χώρας, ζητώντας επίλυση μέσα από την αρχή των (εκάστοτε) κυβερνητικών μεταρρυθμίσεων.

Από το «σύνδρομο του τανζιμάτ» φαίνεται, δηλαδή, εκ νέου να διακατέχονται ταυτόχρονα τόσο το ΑΚΡ, όσο και η κουρδική κοινοβουλευτική εκπροσώπηση.

Η επίκληση στην «οθωμανική αρχή των μεταρρυθμίσεων», μπορεί όμως να  ωφελήσει και τους δύο (αντιμαχόμενους ; ) πολιτικούς εταίρους ; .. ή οδηγεί τον έναν αναπόφευκτα στην αναπαραγωγή ενός πολιτικού φαύλου κύκλου ;

10 Αυγούστου 2009

Islamic radicalism in the Ferghana Valley was expressed mainly by the Akramiya and Hizb ut-Tahrir groups. Despite their diverging methods, all have rallied around a common cause which is the creation of a caliphate ruled by the Shariah. In particular, IMU followers are considered to be seeking to create an Islamic base in south Kyrgystan as a springboard for jihad in Uzbekistan, in collaboration with Uyghur extremists and Al Qaeda.

The Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT)is perhaps the only organisation in the region that its roots can be traced within the Muslim Brotherhood’s realm. Also known as the Islamic Party of Liberation, was founded in Saudi Arabia and Jordan in 1953 by Diaspora Palestinians, led by Sheikh Taqiuddin an-Nabhani Filastyni of the Sunni Shafi’i school of Islamic religious law. According to a Terrorism Focus report “the initial core of the party consisted of members of the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood and after the death of Takieddin al- Nabahani al-Falastini in December of 1979, the amir (leader) of the party became Abd al-Qadim Zallum. He was born in 1925 in the Palestinian town of al-Halil and is currently residing in Jordan. It was under his initiative that the party extended its activities to the former Soviet Republics, and especially to the Muslim states of Central Asia.” The party is relatively moderate, advocating a peaceful and educational Jihad and refraining from guerrilla tactics. The HT’s core belief is that jihad will spread through preaching and dialogue -even though the ultimate goal is to topple Central Asian regimes. The movement has not been characterized as a terrorist organization by the US, but it is seen as a potential threat due to the possibility of establishing ties with other Central Asian terrorist groups.

Beyond the Ferghana Valley, Islamic radicalism is also present throughout Tajikistan, in the southern parts of Kyrgyzstan as well as in nearby states. However, there are mainstream Islamic voices: the Islamic Revival Party of Tajikistan, also known as the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRPT), is legal, national and open to democratic change and it condemns Jihadi activities. With Azerbaijan being more susceptible to Western influence, radical political Islam’a activity there is relatively limited.

Compared to the situation in Central Asia, Islamic radicalism across the Caucasus has increased in the past decade, mainly as a culminating effect of the conflict in Chechnya (1994-1996). Islamist movements in the northern parts of Caucasus have developed through networks, known by different names such as the Islamic International Peacekeeping Brigade and the Special Purpose Islamic Regiment. Supporters are mainly Chechen fighters as well as Arabs who adhere to the doctrine of Wahhabism, but the groups also mobilize militants from Ingushetia, Ossetia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan. Their operational activity focuses on fighting Russia with the aim of creating an independent Chechen state. Training camps are mostly located in south-eastern Chechnya, subsidised and operationally supported by Al-Qaeda affiliates and through financial connections with the Gulf region and Middle Eastern countries. This is a great cause of concern as those movements can appear suddenly, due to their undercover political and military action.

Islamic militant groups have been to a great extent trained by militants linked to Chechen guerrilla fighters, led by Shamil Basayev, as well as by the Arab leaders of the Chechen Jihad, Al-Khattab and Abu Al Walid. In particular, the propagation of radical Wahhabism is overt not only in north eastern Caucasus, Chechnya and Dagestan, but in the north-western Caucasus as well (the Kabardino-Balkariia area and Karachaevo-Cherkessiia). The latter had been a cradle for moderate Wahhabis until 2005. However, the military suppression of Islamists, following the second Chechen war (1999-2000), combined with political and economic turmoil in the region, have helped reinforce Islamic fundamentalism in north-eastern Caucasus as well. Furthermore, South Caucasus, where ethnic and religious diversity is remarkable, is considered a Wahhabi-

Jihadi region, especially in Azerbaijan’s southern areas around Lenkoran and in parts of Georgia.

The moderates, meaning those who emphasize on the importance of Islamic education as the key means for the gradual re-Islamization of the region, are gathered mostly in Azerbaijan and South Caucasus. On the contrary, the radical Islamists or jihadists have embraced the introduction of Islamic rule modeled on the nineteenth century Imamat of Imam Shamil, the Avar religious and political leader of the anti-Russian struggle in the Caucasian war (1817-1864). Being in constant collision with local governments, some of them have been closely linked to the international Islamist centers in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Jordan.

They are primarily funded by Islamic foundations based in the Gulf, receiving scholarships for young Muslims to study abroad and subsidies for the construction of mosques and madrasas.

Of special significance, however, is the conflict between Wahhabis and Sufis (tariqatists), a rather esoteric Islamic trend, in the area of Dagestan. While the former view jihad as an armed struggle, the latter interpret the jihad mainly in spiritual terms. This differentiation has political repercussions, as Sufis are openly accused by the radical Wahhabis for their support of the Mukhu Aliyev regime.

Last but not least, Dagestan has witnessed the merging of Islamism with terrorism represented in the activities of the jamaats Jennet (Paradise) and Shari, radical Islamist groups commonly found in South Caucasus area. The latter are trained for acts of subversion and ideological indoctrination, while one of their new tactics has been shahidism (suicide in the name of Islam), a quite alien practice to their culture and religious traditions. Supportive of armed resistance and guerrilla acts, they are reinforcing the already sturdy North Caucasian Wahhabi Islamic network.

However, the existing doctrinal controversy is not likely to lay the groundwork for a mass Islamic movement in Central Asia. Radical Salafism is still attached to strict religious textualism, in an area where secularism has already gone a long way in undermining religious norms. It remains to be seen whether radical movements can re-emerge and re-assert themselves; until then they will surely remain a disruptive force for Caucasian governments to deal with.

January 2008

Turkey’s predominantly Kurdish provinces in the Southeast still lag far behind the rest of the country in every socioeconomic index, largely as a result of the lack of education in the region. Poor education and high illiteracy rates are directly connected to language barriers for the inhabitants. Education in languages other than Turkish is forbidden by the Turkish Constitution (as formalised in 1982 and in several subsequent laws), rendering teaching the Kurdish language illegal.

In addition, broadcasts cannot have an educational content, they are banned from disseminating the Kurdish language or history, while they have to carry Turkish subtitles. Even with the enactment of the 2004 legislation, only three media outlets received authorization and started broadcasting in Kurdish dialects, however with limited duration and with no educational scope. Apart from the Turkish national television, permission was granted to two local TV channels in Diyarbakır and to one radio station in Şanlıurfa to broadcast in Kurdish for just 30 minutes per week.

However, with the exception of films and music programs, time restrictions apply and all broadcasts, except for music shows, must be subtitled or translated into Turkish. In addition, the 2004 establishment of the first official private Kurdish language school, under EU pressure towards Turkey to recognise Kurdish cultural rights, was short-lived given that it was unaffordable for most Kurds to attend.

Nevertheless, despite long-standing official attempts to suppress it, most Kurds have retained their native language, basically expressed through the dialects of Kermanji and Zaza. Yet, in south-eastern Turkey (mainly in the triangular region between Diyarbakir, Ezurum, and Sivas) children often begin school speaking only their native Kurdish language and thus having little chance of any remarkable school achievement.

Besides, many of them do not even complete the compulsory eight years of elementary education, mainly due to the lack of employment opportunities and poverty. The Mayor of Batman revealed recently that for six months of the year 50% of families migrate to the farms of western Turkey as seasonal agricultural workers. Those children who have started school rarely return to classes.

The lack of school buildings for primary education also contributes to the low rates of schooling. South- east Turkey counts 5594 primary schools, most of them deficient in basic educational material and equipment. At the same time, the shortage of educational personnel results in swelling classrooms for Kurdish students. According to Turkstat statistics, in 2007, there was one teacher for every 30.1 school students in the region, compared to 19.2 in the Aegean coasts.

Generally, in the elementary schools of the region classes number around 60 pupils, while classes of 90- 100 students are also not an unusual phenomenon. The majority of Turkey’s teachers consist of newly- qualified university graduates, who do not wish to teach in the region due to the threat of terrorism, security problems and limited social life, some of them resigning from the job. Their task is to promote through the book manuals the basic principles of Turkishness (Turkluk ilkeleri) as expressed in the Constitution of

1982. Any reference to the Kurdish culture or use of language is illegal. infuse students with the maximum of Turkish common culture in at least 3 years of education. Southeast Turkey covers 546 secondary schools (general and vocational) with a low numbers of student enrolment, especially amongst the Kurdish youth. The small share of Kurdish youth entering secondary educational level is, however, proportionate to the small number of graduates. Approximately 800,000 Kurdish students graduate from high school annually, but half of them are unable to make use of their skills and education due to high levels of unemployment in the region. Only in 2006, the most recent period for which official figures are available, the labour force participation rate in Southeast Turkey stood at just 34.3% compared to a still low 48.0 % in the country as a whole. What is more, the region has the highest fertility rates in Turkey, with young Kurds thus being affected the most by unemployment throughout the region.

As regards higher education, the central campus of Dicle University in Diyarbak?r, counting 11 Faculties and 11 vocational schools, is the only existing institute of higher education, not allowing however any research into the Kurdish language, literature, or culture. At present, roughly 70% percent of the students studying at Dicle University come primarily from Diyarbakir and different cities and towns of the East and South East, while the rest correspond to Turkish students who have not been successful enough in nationwide general proficiency examinations (OSS). In fact, the figure for Kurdish youth entering university is 0.01%, compared to 3% for Turkish students. Kurdish graduates from Dicle University also represent the majority of the qualified labour-force in Diyarbakir and other southeast cities, trying to take advantage of the recent government subsidies for the development of the region.

Within the framework of the South East Anatolian Project (SEAP) (GAP in Turkish) and in addition to state funding for infrastructure and irrigation, R. T. Erdogan recently pledged an additional $850 million for education in the region, as well as the creation of four million new jobs. During one of his speeches in Diyarbakir, Erdogan also promised the restoration of boarding primary schools in Kurdish provinces, as well as the implementation of revised curricula for primary and vocational education.

This recent economic development initiative is seen as a “social restoration project”, aiming to “restrict the terrorist organization’s field for exploitation” by the end of 2012. Nevertheless, the prime minister dismissed calls for wider Kurdish-language education and open broadcasting, arguing that other minorities would demand similar rights.

At the same time a coalition of Kurdish grass-roots organizations supported by university students has already begun a large campaign called “I want to be taught in my mother tongue,” increasingly pressuring the Turkish government to institute Kurdish language education in public schools according to the EU.

Accession Partnership program, while the pro-Kurdish DTP party demands the same through a regional autonomous status for the Kurds.

The Ministry of Education, however, has already clarified its position with a 27-page indictment, accusing students of being part of a campaign that aims to carve a Kurdish homeland inside Turkey. Kemal Guruz, the head of Turkey’s higher education body, ruled out any possibility of Kurdish being used in public education, characterising the Kurdish language as a creation of Kurdish activists (“PKK-inspired”) with the backing of European countries trying to divide Turkey.

Kurdish educational rights are still significantly limited in Turkey. Even if the AKP honors its latest pledges, those will still be merely a substitute for a flourishing Kurdish education. The latter presumes the recognition of the Kurdish minority. In fact, it presumes that Turkey transforms from a state-nation to a modern civil society.

]]> http://www.peyamaazadi.com/niviskar/the-kurdish-non-education-in-southeast-turkey/feed 1 http://www.peyamaazadi.com/niviskar/the-role-of-the-military-sphere-in-building-the-security-order-in-israel http://www.peyamaazadi.com/niviskar/the-role-of-the-military-sphere-in-building-the-security-order-in-israel#comments Tue, 16 Jun 2009 13:20:51 +0000 Veatriki Aravani http://www.agirehar.com/peyam/?p=112 As Israel approaches its jubilee, militarism becomes topical once again, as does the need to examine its crucial role in the building of Israel. The modern Israeli state is still bequeathed with the Zionist sense of moral rightness in the use of power, adopting the militaristic views of most academics, according to which Israel’s perceived need for institutional violence as well for being permanently prepared for both full-scale war and occasional use of limited violence is highly estimated.  As Charles Tilly aptly put it: “Nations make war and war makes nations.” Militarism in the “Israeli case-study” takes a belligerent policy beyond the goal of national defense. The potential adversaries are defined as “militants” and attacks against them are seen as part of a wider defense/deterrence policy.

Israel has introduced institutional arrangements which reproduce its militaristic policy. Israeli schools are still one of the major hubs where the militaristic survivalist is bred; their mission is to form the “New Jew”, the young Israeli citizen trained for the conquest of labour, for settling the land, and guarding (shmira) the state. The judicial system, too, continues to operate on the basis of permanent demands for security deriving from the conflict with the Palestinians, giving high priority to defense requirements and tasks.  A quite interesting phenomenon is the fact that military courts in the Occupied Territories – which differ from military courts in Israel itself since the late 1970s – try non- Israeli citizens (West Bank and Gaza residents) only, operating also under different laws for Jewish settlements and Palestinian municipalities.

Nevertheless, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) -(which include the Israeli Army, the Air Force and the Sea

Corps) still play a central role in preserving the militaristic status of the state, enjoying wide political consensus for its practices of control. The IDF is called upon to deter or repel a full-scale Arab invasion such as the ones experienced both in the first and second Arab-Israeli Wars (1948, 1956), and the one feared during the Six- Day war (1967). Defending the Jewish state’s very existence, “justified” a high level of social and economic mobilization, enabling the government to maintain a high level of military expenditure along with improving the overall economic situation. During 1950-66, Israel spent an average of 9% of GDP on defense, while in the 1956-1966 period, military forces were gradually upgraded from an upstart army to a professional fighting force with nuclear capabilities.

At the same time, the IDF gradually built its civilian image as the great equalizer of the Israeli society. The army cut across ethnic (edah), religious and socio-economic boundaries, uniting Israelis under the ideal of fighting for the “common good”. Military service functioned as a rite of passage, urging the majority to be involved in active combat for defending Jewish land.

Since the 1967 war, mass militarism developed, projecting the image of a society always under Arab siege. This translated into the occupation of the territories, national and religious extremism, and a massive increase in military budgets. This growth of national defense expenditure was in part related to the evolution of the Israeli defense industry and not to reasons of political defense (offensive, not defensive wars). According to economic analysts, a dichotomy developed between the performance of the big economy and that of the small economy, whose activities and investments were decentralized. Since 1957, the big economy has been performing in a manner contrary to the rest of the business sector (the small economy), and it has undergone the same process as its U.S. equivalent, moving to intensive activity in defense development and trade. Besides, the growing role of the U.S. defense industry in the Middle East since 1967 was another decisive element in the build-up of Israel’s militarism. According to Israeli  Professor Shimshon Bichler, within the framework of  his theory of differential accumulation, the increase in the export of military materiel to Israel together with the increase in U.S. military aid, led to an increasing dependence of con-secutive Israeli governments on the U.S. administration, which indirectly subsidized and supported the entrance and involvement of international capital groups into the Middle East.

In addition to economic changes since 1967, the political institutions in Israel also underwent a deep change; the decline of Government power and the sub- sequent state intervention in the economic sphere resulted in direct political roles for the army leadership, mainly through the establishment of a military government in the occupied territories. These developments changed the early pattern of a non-political citizen army, subordinate to the civil authorities, to a new pattern of political-military partnership. This collaboration was even reinforced after the 1973 war and the consequent land loss. The latter served as the primary catalyst for the crystallization of conflict-oriented political priorities. The IDF acquired advanced weaponry and developed sophisticated tactics and restraints quite different from those used in conventional warfare. In particular, the army was extensively used to counter specific terrorist operations within Israel, for example hostage-taking incidents, developing at the same time an Israeli military industrial complex which has influenced the entire economy. The national security effort in Israel in the early 1980s constituted between a quarter and a third of Israel’s GNP, about half of the government’s budget, and involved a fourth of the labour force.

The economic infrastructure of the “security sector” reduced in the 1990’s (though still maintaining one the highest levels of military expenditure in the world). After the Oslo Agreements of 1994, the IDF cut its expenditure, giving place to a deceptive civil militarism. In 1996, the military budget accounted for only 10.6% of the GDP and represented about 21.5% of the total 1996 budget.

The IDF’s military superiority was seen as a tool for moderating Arab political expectations in the conflict. Military force was in fact a means of carrying out diplomacy, which was not highly estimated by a public opinion focused on assimilating the realities of the new cultural war (kulturkamf). According to successive polls during the 1987-1999 period, an average of 35.5 percent of the Jewish Israeli population considered their country’s military strength to be decreasing, while at the same time condemning the military system of mass recruitment.

Peace movements undertook to challenge mass militarism by advancing not a praetorian militaristic system, but a civil one. However, even in the level of rhetoric, the achievement of peace was never presented in unconditional terms and was often equated with Israel’s security. Most of the peace movements were accused of unintended collaboration with the military occupation and Jewish settlements in the territories, being in fact part of social elites strongly embedded in the consolidated militaristic ethos. For instance, most of the “Peace now” activists agreed that it was better to leave Arab citizens out of the political battle over the future of the state, reasoning that conflict-related issues were in fact “internal Jewish matters”. In their view, the achievement of piece in the region would only be attainable if and when the “Arabs” understand that the Jewish state is indestructible.

The “security syndrome” embedded in the entire Israeli society (even in the most peace-friendly segment) has actually urged for more warfare after the collapse of the “peace agreements”, legitimizing additional IDF operations after the second Intifada (2000) and the summer war with Hezbollah (2006). In fact, the latter marked are vival of mass militarism in Israel, which is also discernible in Israel’s current foreign policy.

In particular, Israel’s military leadership, still arguing over acting in self-defense against the Arabs, exacerbates the already technical state of war (not active) that exists between Israel and its two northern neighbors.

The IDF claims that Syria still supplies weaponry to Hezbollah, including medium-range rockets, to replace those destroyed by the Israel Air Force during the Lebanon War, however not intending to spark a direct bilateral conflict. At the same time, the IDF diminishes the possibility of a forehead war with Hezbollah, regarding that the latter is not currently interested in another conflict against Israel due to the physical and material damage it suffered in 2006. Budgetary considerations, however, seem to be a definitive factor in Israel’s policy. Israel’s month-long war against Hizbullah has led to a significant economic losses (a total gap of NIS 8 million-USD 1.8 million) for the Israeli government, which avoids using the military to perform major policing tasks that may diminish its strength.

Current working plans include security challenges facing the IDF together with the lessons learnt from the past and discreet budgetary estimations. Those estimations take into account the concern about global jihad, the risks posed by the Hamas government in the Palestinian Authority and Iran’s nuclear race. As far as the “Palestinian issue” is concerned, Israeli military experts seem to reject the possibility of Mahmoud Abbas taking back control of the Gaza Strip by himself. For the IDF, Hamas continues to be the real danger. Therefore, the military leadership is strongly opposed to the new Yemeni-sponsored reconciliation accord which was signed by the two Palestinians parties, fearing that it could lead to Hamas’ future reinforcement.

The major threat, however, facing the IDF is Iran’s nuclear program and the sense of security that nuclear capabilities will give to Tehran. Israeli concerns about the prospect of Iran attaining independent nuclear manufacturing capability (and using it against Israel) have intensified. Apart from the US help in pressing Iran in the diplomatic sphere, a second step could possibly involve the launching of preventive strikes against Iran’s nuclear installations. According, to Defense News, the Israelis are in the midst of a rigorous effort to test and improve their defensive systems using simulations of Iranian missile attacks. There is the issue of Israel’s expanding missile defence program, which is currently composed of the Israeli Arrow system and the most recent versions of the Patriot system. In this regard, missile defence may be one of the most important guarantees of Israel’s future survival and security, forcing once again Israeli mass militarism.

Given the current political data, Israeli militarism is still massive in proportion, while the perception of a besieged Jewish society persists; “Security” is a rallying call legalizing any type of warfare in order to suppress “external threats”.  Security issues still loom large in the negotiations with “national enemies”, making periodic wars in the future inevitable.